Following a rough and tumble year in the banking industry, Belial Bank’s feckless fearless leader, B.L. Zebub, believes it is high time to bring some levity and loyalty to the lowly troops who have been tirelessly foreclosing all the Beleaguered Borrowers they may have missed the first and second time around.  Mostly, however, B.L. is concerned about the reputational damage his bank has suffered this year.  Once known as the largest bank in America as measured by hubris, it is at risk of losing this mantle of distinction.  On the Chinese calendar, 2012 has been Belial Bank’s Year of the Rat.

B.L. is hoping against hope to instill a sense of pride among the rank and file; he knows that his company’s  promise to the feds to install a “single point of contact” [or “SPOC”] for every borrower seeking help, has become a sham.  Problem is, after a couple of weeks on the job, the SPOCs either quit, get fired, or leave to take more respectable jobs in the collection and repo industries. And then there was the public relations nightmare Belial Bank suffered after it was disclosed to the press that the top brass were giving prizes to supervisors who could run up the highest number of SPOCs for a single borrower in the shortest amount of time.  Last week’s big winner, Art O. DeLay, won a hundred crisp dollar bills and the afternoon off to visit The Devil’s Den Gentlemen’s Club, conveniently located just down the street from Belial’s headquarters.  [Cover charge waived.] Continue reading “Belial Bank’s 2012 Holiday Planning Meeting”

Background. In 2007 Congress passed the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act.  The gist of the law is that for those taxpayers who have had debt cancelled as the result of a principal write-down, short sale, deed-in-lieu, or foreclosure, the ordinary income tax that would normally be assessed is forgiven. There are two primary qualifications: (a) The cancelled debt only applies to loans used to buy, build, or substantially improve a primary residence, and (b) The home must have been used as a primary residence for two of the last five years.  Specifics of the law can be found in an IRS Bulletin, here.  The law is set to expire December 31, 2012.

Until now, Congress, suffering from chronic ADD and being unable to multi-task, could not focus on anything but the 2012 election.  Now that the election is over, Congress is dealing with other items, such as the “Fiscal Cliff,” Dodd-Frank, and everything else they ignored for the past 11 months. Continue reading “Will The Mortgage Forgiveness Law Be Extended?”

This is the second installment of my article looking back over the past five years at Portland housing statistics.  Part One examined the real reason for the housing crisis which officially commenced in 3Q 2007, and looked at the historic numbers for average and median (i.e. “mean”) sale prices according to the RMLS™. The link to Part One is here

 The Rest of the Story. Besides pricing over the past five years, what about time on the market?  Available inventory?  Number of listings? Closed sales? Let’s look at each one:

1.     Time on the MarketUntil 3Q 2007, an overheated real estate market was still burning through inventory.  In August 2007, the average time on the market was 56 days less than two months from listing to “pending sale.”[1]  The following month, September, 2007, banks began realizing that the drumbeat of subprime defaults was not going away.  They tightened their underwriting requirements almost immediately.  Over time, they began to even restrict borrowers from tapping their HELOCs based upon ZIP code.  As short sales and REOs began to fill the real estate marketplace, buyers and appraisers began viewing the sales figures as legitimate comps by which to gauge present value.  All the while, many potential buyers remained on the sidelines, waiting for prices to hit bottom.[2]  Many sellers who were fortunate enough to have equity during the following five years had to decide whether to wait until the market turned, or sell their home and recover far less equity than they had earlier.[3] Continue reading “Portland Metro Housing Prices – The Last Five Years [Part Two]”

Background – 3Q 2007.  Looking back, August 2007 was a memorable month, filled with good news and bad.  Based upon RMLS™ numbers, it was a statistically impressive month for closed residential transactions in the Portland Metro area.  The bad news was that it was the last such month we were to see. From that point forward, in almost every meaningful category, the local housing stats just kept getting worse.

The Credit Crisis – 3Q 2007.[1]  Quietly, and with little public fanfare, in the third quarter of 2007, worrisome cracks began to appear in the country’s financial system. They were first noticed by those who monitor these things, such as the Federal Reserve. They were also noticed by some who actually had a hand in causing the cracks to occur.[2]

In short, the credit markets began seizing up; access to short term borrowing engaged in by companies was drying up.  Normally, large businesses financed their daily operations through the sale of commercial paper, i.e. secured and unsecured short term loans.  The Federal Reserve recognized the crunch, and in September 2007, cut interest rates by 50-basis points, or one-half of one percent. The purpose in so doing was to provide liquidity for financial institutions and investment houses so they could continue to survive. Bloomberg explained it well in its September 27, 2007 article titled “U.S. Commercial Paper Drop Slows After Fed Cuts Rates (Update5)”: Continue reading “Portland Metro Housing Prices – The Last Five Years [Part One]”

OK, I admit it!  I am suffering from chronic MERS fatigue.  Every few days, in some part of the country, MERS gets sued by someone.  Sometimes it involves a pending foreclosure; other times it involves some state or county suing to recover lost recording fees.  And the beat goes on. MERS apologists, aka the Big Banks and their toadies attorneys, appear before one judge or another with arguments so specious as to make intellectually honest lawyers grimace and intellectually dishonest lawyers grin. – PCQ

On Thursday evening, November 15, we learned through the Oregonian, that the Multnomah County Commissioners unanimously authorized the filing of a lawsuit against Mortgage Electronic Registry System, also known as “MERS,” which describes itself as follows: Continue reading “MERS Fatigue”

Question [Hardship Letters].  I am trying to do a short sale.  The bank is asking me for a “hardship letter.”  What is it they are looking for?  Do I have to have some life changing event to qualify for help, such as divorce or some financial calamity?

Answer. I rarely, if ever, have seen a borrower’s “hardship” – or lack thereof – become an impediment to their securing a resolution of their distressed housing event through short sale or deed-in-lieu. I view the hardship letter as a sort of “price of admission” in order for the banks to “justify” their providing assistance.  Despite what they might say to the contrary, many banks simply won’t help borrowers unless they are in some form of payment default.  For those folks who may be making a respectable living, but are so strapped on a day-to-day basis because of a large mortgage payment, I believe this fact alone is a valid “hardship.”  If this financial pressure is coupled with a desire or need to downsize, relocate, or other legitimate reasons, it should be included in the hardship letter.  In most cases, folks who got their loans in 2005, 2006, or 2007, were in far stronger circumstance than they are today.  That should be addressed.  For example “When we first got our loan in 2005, we were both fully employed and our combined incomes could support the mortgage payments.  That is not the case today.” Continue reading “Distressed Housing FAQs”

Introduction. Recently there have been some anecdotal reports that real estate licensees, presumably with the knowledge and consent of sellers and buyers, have engaged in some practices that could be regarded, at best, as “sketchy.”

Here is the issue:

In some short sale transactions, there have been apparent instances of brokers not submitting repair addenda to the lender/servicer whose consent is being sought. This would most likely arise in situations where sellers – who may not contribute funds to the transaction without their lenders’ consent – enter into a side agreement with buyers to make certain nonessential[1] repairs. This side agreement, usually memorialized on an addendum to the Sale Agreement, is concealed from the seller’s lender. In some cases, this omission may also include the mortgage lender who is funding the buyer’s purchase of the short sale property.

Discussion.  What follows is a list of reasons[2] why this practice should be avoided: Continue reading “Realtor Alert – Short Sale Fraud”

“Some borrowers default because they no longer possess the ability to repay their mortgage loans. However, there is a group of borrowers who may continue to possess the ability to repay but who elect to default for strategic reasons. These borrowers are commonly referred to as “strategic defaulters.” For purposes of this report, strategic defaulters have the financial means to make their monthly mortgage payments, but choose not to and walk away from their contractual commitments to pay.”  FHFA’s Oversight of the Enterprises’ Efforts to Recover Losses from Foreclosure Sales – FHFA Office of Inspector General [Audit Report October 17, 2012]

The online website, DSNews,[1] recently posted an article announcing that “According to a recent survey that polled 1,026 U.S. adults, 32 percent stated they believe homeowners should be able to strategically default without facing consequences.” The survey was conducted by JZ Analytics, pollster John Zogby’s company. According to the article, Mr. Zogby personally found the results “alarming.”  “What jumped out is how many Americans feel it is acceptable for homeowners to walk away from a mortgage and go into foreclosure. If Americans carry on with that mindset, it will continue to cause problems as the economy undergoes a slow recovery.”

What I found “alarming,” and what jumped out at me, was that Mr. Zogby, who supposedly has his finger on the pulse of America, would be surprised at all.  So, in an effort to learn more about this senior analyst at JZ Analytics, I dug into the deepest recesses of the Internet, and the best I could determine was that he apparently has been on Mars for the last five years looking for signs of intelligent life that he could give polling surveys to.  Given this professional hiatus, perhaps Mr. Zogby can be forgiven for his incredibly lunk-headed reaction to an incredibly complicated issue.

Unfortunately, we’ll never know the exact questions that were used in the polling or the demographics of the persons polled.  I’m guessing Mr. Zogby gave the poll out along with party favors at a liquor-infused retreat for lending industry big shots at some Bahamian luxury resort.

But never mind ignorant polls, polling, and pollsters.  The term “strategic default” is a pejorative term cooked up by Fannie, Freddie, and the lending and servicing industries to stigmatize the banks’ former clients as irresponsible deadbeats.  [“Don’t bother using your own money for a downpayment; we’ll just piggyback another loan on top of your first one, so you can use the bank’s money to finance 100% of your home purchase – it’s virtually free, and you can refinance over and over again, and never have to pay it off!”]  Technically, the term “strategic default,” includes an implicit assumption that the borrower can “afford” to make their loan payments, but consciously chooses not to do so.

But let’s look at the real picture:

  • The subprimers, no-doc-loan and stated-income crowd, washed out within months of their loan closing.  They were financially unqualified from the start and both lender and borrower knew it. But as long as real estate values were going through the roof, there was always a “Plan B”; either refinance[2] out of the oppressive loan[3], or sell the property at a profit.  This was in 2005; there was no such thing as a “strategic default” back then.  There was no choice, no decision, and certainly no strategy.  Within a month or two of funding, the Big Banks got their money back as the loans were packaged and sold into pass-through trusts as securities for investors to gobble up, believing the shills in the crowd ratings agencies’ assurances that they were AAA grade investments.
  •  So who are the folks defaulting today? Having spoken with hundreds of Oregonians in various stages of distressed housing situations, I believe I know.  [Mr. Zogby, are you listening?] They are the folks who, despite the loss of 40% – 50% of their home’s value; despite the loss of their entire downpayment; and despite the fact that they may owe the bank $100,000+ more than their home is worth, they’re still hanging on. In other words, they have become captive renters, unable to move forward; many used their retirement funds [at the cost of a 10% income tax surcharge]; their children’s 529 savings, and some even use their credit cards.
  • Not to be forgotten in an analysis of the term “strategic default,” is the meaning of the word “strategic.”  Obviously, it suggests a conscious decision.  In fact, it suggests more.  It implies an intelligent, considered analysis. However, in the vernacular of the lending industry and their apologists, the term includes an inference that the borrower can “afford” to make the payment, but elects not to do so.  Contrary to the short sighted analysis of some [Mr. Zogby, are you still listening?],the word “afford” is a highly relative term. For example, perhaps one can “afford” their mortgage payments, but at what long term cost?  Here are some considerations that many folks factor into their decision to discontinue making their mortgage payments:
    • The 3-Ds, Death, Divorce, and Debt.  For example, when one loses a spouse or significant other, who was wholly or partially financially responsible for making ends meet.  Divorce speaks for itself, and more loudly in times of financial stress than harmony.  Debt plays a factor, when – as many folks did – strapped borrowers lived off their credit cards or lines of credit.
    • Children. This is a broad topic.  Here are a few aspects of the issue: (a) A young couple wants to have children, but their home, its location and/or size make that impossible.  They need to move on, but are being suffocated by a home awash in negative equity. (b) School districts; a family wants to move into a district more suitable for their children. (c) Pregnancy; the family wants to move closer to friends and family to help raise the child. (d) Savings for children and their education; Homeowners are presented with a choice to pay for schooling, or for a mortgage that has thousands of dollars of negative equity that will not – for the next decade – ever become positive equity.
    • Employment.  During the economic downturn that has plagued this country since 2007, many folks lost jobs.  Some still had jobs, but found better employment opportunities elsewhere.  However, they did not have sufficient funds to bring to closing to pay off thousands of dollars of negative equity. 
    • Loan Modifications.  Although some lenders may deny it, the truth is that before most lenders will even consider a loan modification, the borrower must be in default.  I have had many clients who report that although they were not in default when they first sought the bank’s help to modify their loan, they were told they had to stop making payments.  What they weren’t told was that it would damage their credit; that the bank would pile on late fees and other charges. Moreover, many such “modifications” were denied after a year or more of trying – and at the end, applicants were informed they did not qualify. But by then, the loan was so far delinquent that it was impossible for the homeowner to get current.  [Riddle me this Batman Mr. Zogby: Does following the banks’ instruction to stop paying the mortgage count as a “strategic default”?]
    • Life.   In addition to the above, there are circumstances thrown at all of us by fate.  Illness and accidents being prime examples.  The vagaries of life can have catastrophic consequences on one’s ability to pay their mortgage.  But unlike the days when banks actually held on to their own loans, now it’s pretty hard to go to your neighborhood banker for help.  Rather, today, struggling borrowers are given 1-800 numbers answered by low-paid employees with bogus titles [e.g. “Office of the President and CEO”].  In some instances, these jobs have been outsourced, and the person at the other end of the line knows nothing beyond what’s in their script.

But wait, there’s more!  Mr. Zogby’s above quote seems to equate not paying one’s mortgage with “going into foreclosure.”  In fact, foreclosure does not necessarily follow from the act of not paying one’s mortgage.  Many, many, folks are fully prepared to try to short sell their homes rather than being foreclosed.

This option presents several advantages for both lender and borrower: (a) A short sale is a much faster disposition option than any other pre-foreclosure alternative; (b) Certainly, it is much faster than waiting around to be foreclosed, which today occurs in fits and starts, as the Big Banks continue to be entangled in fiascos of their own making, such as MERS, robo-signing, borrower litigation, and a variety of other public relation embarrassments ; (c) A short sale is generally regarded by borrowers as having less of a stigma than being foreclosed; (d) Banks prefer the short sale process because that moves the property into the marketplace, where the carrying cost of taxes, insurance, and maintenance are shifted to new buyers. (d) Short sales are preferable to the banks over deeds-in-lieu-of-foreclosure, since, again, a short sale shifts the carrying costs to new buyers.

Not to be outdone in the Nuts and Dolts Department, Mr. Zogby’s effort at insightful comment to DSNews demonstrates a complete lack of understanding about today’s financial crisis. After climbing out on a shaky limb, he proceeds to saw it off thusly: “If Americans carry on with that [strategic default] mindset, it will continue to cause problems as the economy undergoes a slow recovery.”

Wrong, again, Boy Wonder.  Today, our “slow recovery” isn’t the result of borrowers not paying their mortgages.  In fact, if there were more folks who – for whatever good faith reason – chose to stop paying the mortgage on their underwater homes, they would get queued up faster for some form of pre-foreclosure disposition, such as a short sale or deed-in-lieu.  

[BTW, I will accept almost any reason as a “good faith” reason. Remember, the bargain the banks cut with their borrowers and vice versa – which was memorialized in the promissory note and trust deed or mortgage – was that “If you don’t repay the loan, we get to take the home back and resell it to somebody else.” Also, remember that back in circa 2005 – 2007, both borrower and lender believed that skyrocketing property values eliminated any risk of payment default and foreclosure. At the time, no one, not even Alan Greenspan, saw what was to come from the “frothy” real estate market and essentially “free credit.”  In other words, the assumption by all was that even if a borrower defaulted and was unable to refinance, the lender would get a property back that was worth more than when the loan was first made.  To put a finer point on this Grand Bargain is to perhaps explain what it was not.  It was not an agreement that borrowers must pay on a loan even if it no longer made any economic sense; it was not that repayment was “required” even if doing so was to the financial detriment, and possible fiscal ruin, of the borrower and his/ her family and future.

Rather, the deal between borrower and bank has always been clearly provided in the loan documents:  “You pay off the loan and we will remove our lien from your property; You default and we get to take your property and resell it to satisfy your debt to us.”  Nowhere in the loan documents is “strategic default” – whatever that is, addressed. – PCQ]

For Mr. Zogby and others who believe their expertise in one field qualifies them to make foolish statements in unrelated fields, the reason this country has undergone a “slow recovery” is thanks to our cracker jack government leaders who gave us HFA, HAMP, HARP [1.0 and 2.0], HAFA, First Time Buyer Incentives, and on and on, ad nauseum.   The theory was to create the illusion that the Administration was actually doing something to help homeowners by throwing money at the problems, regardless of whether they worked. [This is discussed more fully here. – PCQ] But what the government didn’t do is FORCE – politically or otherwise – the Big Banks, who caused this crisis in the first place – to recast loans so they would work for homeowners.  However, bank and servicer compliance is always voluntary.  It’s all carrot, no stick.

The fact is that continental shift moves at light speed compared to loan modifications. The government has willingly permitted the Big Banks to game the system for the last five years. A crowning example of the government’s approach to helping consumers is to create the Dodd-Frank Act, a tome of 2,300 pages of gibberish that did nothing but leave the heaving lifting to the administrative process, where lender lobbyists could wine and dine their favorite political hack in order to emasculate the rulemaking.  Today, over two years since enactment, the scorecard stands as follows: 63% of its rulemaking deadlines have already passed and only 29% of the required rulemakings have been finalized.  Nice job.  Virtually every government solution, including the faux $25 Billion National Mortgage Settlement, has been voluntary for the banks. The White House talks tough, but treats the lending industry more like Johnny Appleseed than John Dillinger. In short, Big Banks are permitted to cherry pick who, what, when, why, where, and which, borrowers they will help.  The ones most in need of assistance never receive it. Default – or whatever pejorative one chooses to use, is the last resort.

When you couple the total failure of the government borrower assistance programs with the unemployment numbers, you get the real reason for our slow recovery.  Homeowners are held hostage in homes they (a) can either no longer afford, or (b) need to move from for any number of reasons.  Distress ensues.  Job creation and relocation suffer.  Confidence drops. Poll that Mr. Zogby!

Although I am not a fan of moral equivalency, no thoughtful discussion of “Strategic Default” is complete without comparing the plight of Beleaguered Borrowers with the fortunes of Big Bank execs for the last five years.  Part Two will explore that topic.



[1] “DS” as in “Default Servicing.”

[2] Refinancing generally requires a 60% loan to value (“LTV”), but with market value appreciation, it was presumed that would occur.

[3] Many had “teaser” rates that were unrealistically low, and then adjusted to much higher rates.  Some loans permitted borrowers to pay less than the stated interest rate, which meant that the deferred interest was added back to the principal and would also bear interest.  These were the infamous “negatively amortizing” loans or “Neg-Ams.”

As a follow-up to my last post on difficult short sales (here), it occurs to me that I should mention the small, but persistent complaint of some seller-clients, who are under the mistaken belief that their Realtor® can and will handle the entire transaction for them.  “Two liens? No problem!  We’ll negotiate everything!”  But in fact, if the property is encumbered by two liens with two separate lenders or servicers, it can be a big problem – and if it comes down to a seller/borrower paying a “contribution,” this is something the Realtor® cannot negotiate; it’s up to the seller/borrower to decide if they can afford a contribution, or if they are willing to go on the hook by signing a promissory note.

If the short sale transaction has gotten all the way to closing, and the seller/borrower is having their first discussion with their agent about this, something is wrong.  At the first hint that a seller/borrower contribution may be demanded, the real estate agent should immediately discuss with their client what the options are – and they can be somewhat limited.

How is a short sale agent to know, in advance if there may be a problem?  Answer: Do the numbers. Will there be enough money from the net sale proceeds to pay off the first lienholder?  If not, this means that the first lender has complete control over how much it will contribute to the second.  And the first lender will not permit the borrower/seller contribute anything to the second.  In most cases, the first lienholder will allocate not more than $3,000 or $6,000 to the second, usually depending upon the net proceeds from the short sale.

The next question is “How much is owed to the second?  If it is $100,000 or more, $3,000 or $6,000 may not be sufficient to satisfy the second lender.  This means there could be a deadlock, unless the buyer is willing to bridge the gap by paying the shortfall to the second if the first lender will allow it. Will the Realtor® contribute?  Remember, these payments must be disclosed on the HUD-1 settlement statement, and it is far better to address a “bridging the gap” solution on an Addendum to the Sale Agreement early on in the transaction. Unfortunately, some real estate agents focus on the obtaining the first lender’s consent before ever contacting the second.

Short sellers are fearful enough. They don’t like surprises.  So for those real estate agents offering their services as “short sale experts,” they must first do the numbers, try to foresee the problems in advance, discuss them early on with the client – and never, never, never promise more than you can deliver!

Over the course of the past two and one-half years, I’ve met with hundreds of folks experiencing the trauma of dealing with huge negative equity in their homes.  In lay terms, they’re “underwater” – meaning that the value of their home has dropped below what they paid, and frequently is now less than what they owe. This has become a common phenomenon over the past five years. But frequently, being underwater is not the only problem. If it were, many homeowners would likely remain where they are.  However, an additional circumstance, such as one of the feared 3-Ds, Death, Divorce, and Debt, is frequently an accompanying factor that has brought homeowners to my office.

This post will focus on the Scylla and Charybdis of home ownership today: Distressed housing coupled with a distressed marriage. Here are some tips, traps, caveats, and general observations that I’ve gleaned from distressed housing clients contemplating divorce:

I. GENERAL THOUGHTS
• Don’t keep looking in the rear-view mirror – you’ll drive off the road!  How and why you got here is a concern that runs a distant second to where you’re now going. In most cases, the clients I’ve met who were anticipating divorce avoided the blame-game, and wanted to make the best of a difficult situation. This is a good thing; a collaborative, realistic and rational approach to a solution is much better than an adversarial one.
• Good information can be liberating.  Fear thrives best when allowed to feed on misinformation.  Most people are inundated with opinions, rumors, and horror stories about the foreclosure crisis. They need to separate fact from fiction before they can make informed decisions about what to do in their own personal situation. Armed with good information, I’ve seen clients make far better choices for their mutual best interests – even when they are planning to divorce. Continue reading “Distressed Housing, Distressed Marriage”